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We present a simple combinatorial construction for the mapping of the biometric vectors to short strings, called the passwords.
A verifier has to decide whether a given vector can be considered as a corrupted version of the original biometric vector whose
password is known or not. The evaluations of the compression factor, the false rejection/acceptance rates, are derived, and an
illustration of a possible implementation of the verification algorithm for the DNA data is presented.
1. Introduction
Let us consider the data transmission scheme in Figure 1.
The source generates a vector b ∈ {0, 1}N containing
the outcomes of the measurements of some biometric
parameters of a user. This vector is encoded as the vector
pw(b) ∈ {0, 1}K , called the password of the user, which is
stored in the database under the user’s name. The password is
read from the database upon request and given to the verifier
together with the vector b′ ∈ {0, 1}N generated by some
source. The verifier has to check whether the vector b′ can
be considered as a corrupted version of the vector b (accept)
or not (reject). The decision can be expressed as the value
of a Boolean function ϕ(pw(b), b′) ∈ {Acc, Rej}, and the
formal specification of the procedure is an assignment of the
functions
pw: {0, 1}N −→ {0, 1}K ,
ϕ: {0, 1}K × {0, 1}N −→ {Acc, Rej}.
(1)
The scheme in Figure 1 shows a conventional biometric
authentication system [1]. We apply our coding theory
approaches [2–4] to find solutions for the following setup.
(1) The length of the binary representation of the
password pw(b) is much less than the length of the
vector b, that is, K  N .
(2) The probability distribution over the vectors b is not
given, and the performance is analyzed for the worst
assignment of the input data.
(3) The function pw is a deterministic function. There-
fore, the distribution of common randomness
between the encoder and the verifier, which is
a feature of randomized hashing schemes, is not
relevant in our case. The probabilities of the incorrect
verifier’s decisions are computed over the noise
ensemble.
(4) If the vector b′ is a corrupted version of the vector
b, then the level of noise is measured by the absolute
value of the diﬀerence of the Hamming weights of the
vectors b and b′.
Notice that many authors addressed the problem of
constructing fault-tolerant passwords, and the list [5–9]
is far from being complete. The main diﬀerence of the
setup analyzed in our correspondence is the point that the
scheme does not require randomization. As a result, our
approach can essentially simplify an implementation and
simultaneously cause some security problems, which are
discussed below.
As pw is a deterministic function and the compression
factor N/K is large; an attacker, who knows pw(b) and wants
to pass through the verification stage with the acceptance








Figure 1: The data transmission scheme designed for the authen-
tication of a user, where b, b′ ∈ {0, 1}N ,pw(b) ∈ {0, 1}K , and
ϕ(pw(b), b′) ∈ {Acc, Rej}.
decision, can easily succeed by generating a vector b′ such
that pw(b′) = pw(b). Therefore, the scheme is not secure
in the same sense as the system, which uses the PIN codes
of the users: if the PIN code is stolen and the attacker can
enter it into the system, then he succeeds. Thus, one needs
to encrypt passwords, and our construction can serve as a
preliminary step for conventional schemes. Another kind of
security is the possibility of guessing the biometric vector on
the basis of its password. If the password is the weight of the
vector (which is a special case of our construction), then the
probability of the correct guess is very small for most of the
vectors. However, the weights 0 and n uniquely determine
the vector. Thus, meaning the points above, the secrecy of the
scheme can be not suﬃcient for its separate use in practical
biometric systems. However, a very large compression factor,
very small probabilities of the incorrect verifier’s decisions,
and very small complexity of the implementation of our
scheme that can be attained simultaneously make such a
scheme attractive. In particular, we can recommend it for
information transmission systems where the verifier has to
make only the rejection decision for the vectors b′ that
definitely cannot be considered as corrupted versions of the
original biometrical vector. The final decision for the vectors
that passed through this test is made by some other tools in
this case.
2. Model for the Noise of Observations
We will assume that
N = Tn, (2)
where T ,n are positive integers and n is even. Represent the
vectors b and b′ as concatenations of T blocks of length n
and write
b = (b1, . . . , bT), b′ =
(





where bt, b′t ∈ {0, 1}n for all t = 1, . . . ,T . The blocks
will be processed in parallel, and we describe the model for
the probabilistic transformation of an input block b to the
received block b′ having the weights
w = wt(b), w′ = wt(b′). (4)
If the received block is generated independently of the input
block, we assume that w′ is the value of a random variable
having the binomial probability distribution









If the received block is a corrupted version of the input
block, we assume that w′ is the value of a random variable
having the given conditional probability distribution
(Ω(w′ | w), w′ ∈ {0, . . . ,n}). (7)
Examples. (1) Binary symmetric channel.
Suppose that the vector b′ is the outcome of a binary
symmetric channel having the crossover probability p ∈
(0, 1/2) when the vector b was sent. Then,


















′+ j(1− p)w′− j .
(8)
(2) The insertion/deletion channel.







be the probability that n− k components of the vector b are
noiselessly transmitted, while the remaining k positions are
filled with an arbitrary vector generated with the probability( n
k
)
2−n. Then, Ω(w′ | w) is expressed by (8) with ε/2
substituted for p.
In the following numerical illustrations, we assume that
the conditional probabilities Ω(0 | w), . . ., Ω(n | w) are
defined by (8).
Discussion over the Model. As the input vector b is fixed,
the vector w is also fixed. Given an acceptance set, the
probability that the verifier makes an incorrect rejection
decision can be computed after the conditional probabilities
Ω(0 | w), . . . ,Ω(n | w) are specified. However, one cannot
compute the probability that the verifier makes an incorrect
acceptance decision for the best strategy of an attacker, unless
the probability distribution over the input vectors (which
determines the probability distribution over passwords) is
given. We can only compute this probability for a blind
attacker, who generates the vector b′ by flipping a fair coin,
which results in the binomial probability distribution over
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passwords w′. Then, computations become equivalent to the
estimation of the ratios of the cardinalities of the sets of input
vectors with coinciding passwords and 2−Tn. Notice that
this estimation is a typical problem when universal hashing
schemes are studied [10]. Since our scheme is oriented
to the preprocessing of the pairs of received vectors, the
performance of the scheme for a blind attacker is also of
interest for practical biometric applications.
3. Description of the Verification Scheme
Given the vectors b = (b1, . . . , bT) and b′ = (b′1, . . . , b′T),
let pw(b) = w and pw(b′) = w′, where components of the
vectors w and w′ are defined as wt = wt(bt) and w′t = wt(b′t)
for all t = 1, . . . ,T . Thus,
pw(b) = (wt(b1), . . . , wt(bn)),
pw(b′) = (wt(b′1
)






For all vectors w ∈ {0, . . . ,n}T , let D (T)(w) ⊆ {0, . . . ,n}T be
a subset of vectors of the length T whose components belong
to the alphabet {0, . . . ,n}, which is called the acceptance set





Acc, if w′ ∈D (T)(w),
Rej, if w′ /∈D (T)(w).
(11)
The verification scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.
Notice that the compression factor, defined as the ratio
of the length of the biometric vector and the length of the




and it does not depend on T .
The possible verification errors are the false rejection of
the identical biometric entity and the false acceptance of the
diﬀerent biometric entity. The probabilities of these events,





























The false rejection event corresponds to the case when
the blocks of the input biometric vector are transmitted over
a channel in such a way that weights of these blocks are
transformed to the weights of the received blocks by a memo-
ryless channel specified by the conditional probabilitiesΩ(0 |
w), . . . ,Ω(n | w). The false acceptance event corresponds to
the case when the blocks of the received vector are generated
by a Bernoulli source having the probabilities of zeroes and
ones equal to 1/2.
The goals of the designer of the system can be dif-
ferent. In particular, the acceptance set D (T)(w) can be
assigned according to the maximum likelihood decision rule.
Another assignment is oriented to the minimization of the
absolute value of the diﬀerence of FRR(w, D (T)(w)) and
FAR(w, D (T)(w)). Furthermore, this set can be assigned in
such a way that the false rejection/acceptance rate is fixed
and the false acceptance/rejection rate is minimized. We will
present the assignments of the decision sets that provide us
with small decoding error probabilities of both types, which
makes eﬃcient solutions to the above problems possible.
Our main claim can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 1. The decision sets D (T)(w), w ∈ {0, . . . ,n}T , can
be assigned in such a way that the scheme has the following
features:
(a) the compression factor β is expressed by (12), and
it tends to 0 as an almost linear function of n
independently of T , and
(b) the false acceptance and the false rejection rates tend to




and EFRR,EFAR tend to constants depending only on p,
as n increases.
The (a) part of the claim directly follows from the
description of the scheme. The (b) part of the claim follows
from the analysis presented in Section 5. Notice that the
fact that the probabilities of error exponentially vanish
with T when the expected values of the corresponding
random variables diﬀer is a classical result of detection
and estimation theory [11]. We will meet the situation of
coinciding expected values, and such a behavior is attained
due to the diﬀerence of the variances of these variables.
Let us first discuss possible approaches to constructing
verification schemes for the noiseless case (p = 0) when the
biometric vectors are mapped to passwords by a determinis-
tic function. In this case, the verifier constructs the password
for the vector b′ and makes the acceptance decision if and
only if it coincides with the password associated with the
claimed user. As a result, the false rejection rate is equal to
0: if b′ = b, then the passwords are identical.
Suppose that the password is defined as a binary vector
of length T where the tth bit is the parity of the tth block
of the vector b (the tth bit of the password is equal to 1 if
and only if the weight of the vector bt is odd), t = 1, . . . ,T .
Then, the compression factor is equal to Tn/T = n and the
false acceptance rate is equal to 2−T , that is, the scheme has
a similar features as our scheme. However, to attain a large




















Figure 2: The structure of the verification scheme.
compression factor for p > 0, one needs a very large T to
obtain low false rejection and false acceptance rates. Another
approach to the verification for the noiseless case is based
on the specification of the password as a vector consisting of
weights of the blocks. Then, the compression factor is equal


















It decreases with T as an exponential function and decreases
with n as a polynomial function. We claim that a similar
conclusion is also valid for p ∈ (0, 1/2).
4. Processing the 1-Block Vectors
Suppose that T = 1, denote b = b, b′ = b′, and use the






Acc, if w′ ∈D(w),
Rej, if w′ /∈D(w).
(17)
The maximum likelihood decision rule is implemented by
using the acceptance set
D(w) = {w′ ∈ {0, . . . ,n} : Ω(w′ | w) > B(w′)}. (18)











where δ0 and δ1 are the minimum integers satisfying the
inequalities Ω(w − δ0 | w) > B(w − δ0) and Ω(w + δ1 | w) >
B(w + δ1).
To check the (b) claim of the theorem, we use the
Gaussian approximations
Ω(w′ | w) −→ Ω˜(w′ | w), (20)
B(w′) −→ B(w′), (21)
where
























stands for the Gaussian probability density function with
the mean m and the variance σ2. The convergence (21)
is the standard Gaussian approximation for the binomial
















′+ j(1− p)w′− j
−→ G(w′ − j;wq,wp(1− p))
(23)
for all j ∈ {0, . . . ,w′}. Furthermore, the replacement of the
sum over j at the right-hand side of (8) with the integral over
j taken over the interval (−∞, +∞) results in (20).
In particular, Ω˜(n/2) and B˜ are two Gaussian probability
density functions having the same mean n/2 and diﬀerent
variances equal to np(1 − p) and n/4, respectively. The
maximum likelihood decoding in this case is equivalent to
the selection of one of two hypotheses about the variance
of the Gaussian probability distributions having the same
mean. It is well known (see, for example [12]) that the



























Figure 3: Example of the probability distributions Ω˜(n/2) and B˜.
probabilities of the incorrect decisions are determined by the
ratio of variances, which is equal to p(1− p)/(1/4) and does
not depend on n.
The simplest upper bound for the false acceptance
and the false rejection rates can be expressed using the
Bhattacharyya distance [13] between the probability density













w′ : Ω˜(w′ | w) > B(w′)
}
. (25)
Examples of the probability density functions Ω˜(w′ |
n/2) and B˜(w′) are given in Figure 3 where we also show
the false rejection and the acceptance rates for the maximum
likelihood decision rule.






Ω˜(w′ | w)B˜(w′) dw′. (26)
The inequalities (26) follow from the observations





Ω˜(w′ | w) ≥ 1,








The multiplications of the probabilities Ω˜(w′ | w) and
B˜(w′) in (24) by the square roots above and extension of the
integration over all possible values of w′ bring the desired
bounds.
The value of the integral at the right-hand side of (26)
can be easily computed using the statement below.
Proposition 1. For all pairs (m1, σ1) and (m2, σ2) such that

























The proof is given in the Appendix.
The use of (28) with (m1, σ1) = ((n − w)p + w(1 −
p),np(1− p)) and (m1, σ1) = (n/2,n/4) shows that the worst
case corresponds to w = n/2 and
















The bounds (29) are very simple, but they can be useless. For
example, if p = 0.05, then δ = 0.856. If the acceptance set
for the vector w consisting of T blocks is defined as the set
of vectors w′ such that w′t ∈ D˜(wt) for at least T/2 indices
t ∈ {1, . . . ,T} and the estimate of the probability of incorrect
decision for each block is greater than 1/2, then the estimate
of probability of incorrect decision for T blocks is close to
1. Nevertheless, if the acceptance set is defined diﬀerently,
considerations of this section are of interest.
5. Processing the T-Block Vectors
Let us first summarize our verification scheme, which can be
also called a basic scheme.
Enrollment. Represent the input vector b of length Tn as
a result of concatenation of T blocks of length n. Compute
the weights of the blocks w1, . . . ,wn and store them in the
database as the vector w.
Verification. Having received a binary vector b′, con-
struct the vector of weights of its blocks and denote this











and make the acceptance decision if the obtained value
is greater than a fixed threshold Λ that has to be chosen
in advance depending on the requirements to the false
acceptance and the false rejection rates, that is,















FRRΛ(w) = FRR(w), FARΛ(w) = FAR(w), (33)
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Table 1: Some values of ΔTn and ΔT .
n β p = 0.01 p = 0.05 p = 0.10
32 5.3 5.19 14.91 36.56
64 9.1 4.78 14.51 36.27
128 16.0 4.51 14.23 36.06
256 28.4 4.31 14.06 35.94
512 51.2 4.18 13.96 35.87
1024 93.1 4.10 13.90 35.82
∞ ∞ 4.01 13.86 35.80
when FRR(w), FAR(w) are defined by (13) with the set
D (T)Λ (w) substituted for the set D






























The probabilities introduced above can be easily esti-
mated for Λ = 0, which corresponds to the maximum
likelihood decision rule. Namely,












FR˜R0(w), FA˜R0(w) ≤ δT , (38)
where δ is defined in (30). Hence, − ln δn is a lower bound on
the exponents EFRR,EFAR in (15).
Let us denote
ΔTn = 1−lgδn , ΔT =
1
−lgδ . (39)
Then, the inequalities (36) can be represented as the
following statement: if T = kΔTn, then
FRR0(w), FAR0(w) ≤ 10−k. (40)
Similarly, the inequalities (38) can be represented as the
following statement: if T = kΔT , then
FR˜R0(w), FA˜R0(w) ≤ 10−k. (41)
Some values of ΔTn and ΔT are given in Table 1.
Suppose that the biometric vectors have length N =
4 Kbytes = 32568 bits. Let us partition this length in T =
128 blocks of length n = 256 bits (we will refer to the
corresponding line in Table 1). In our scheme, each block is
mapped to a binary vector of length log 257 = 9 bits, and
the length of the password is equal to 9T = 1152 bits =
144 bytes. The compression factor is equal to β = 256/9 =
28.4. Suppose that p = 0.05. Then, the expected number
of errors when the biometric vector is corrupted is equal
to 32568 · 0.05 = 6514, which is 5.6 times greater than
the length of the password. Nevertheless, we attain the false
rejection and the false acceptance rates not greater than
10−128/14.06 < 10−9. Furthermore, if T is increased twice and
becomes equal to 256 (the length of the vectors is equal to
8 Kbytes), then the false rejection and the false acceptance
rates are not greater than 10−256/14.06 < (10−9)2 = 10−18.
Similar conclusions can be drawn for any length in a way
that the increase of the length by 14 blocks reduces the false
rejection and the false acceptance rates 10 times. If p = 0.01
or p = 0.1, then we have to substitute 4.31 or 35.94 for 14.06
in these considerations. Notice also that these numbers are
very close to the numbers that are asymptotically attained
and have a simple formal expression.
6. A Variant of the Verification Scheme
Based on Balancing
For all i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, let 1i0n−i denote the vector constructed
by the concatenation of i ones and n− i zeroes. For example,

























































The vector c is called a balanced vector if it contains equal
number of zeroes and ones. Thus, the weight of a balanced
vector is equal to n/2.
Given a vector b, let
I(b) =
{








denote the set of indices i such that the transformation
b −→ b⊕ 1i0n−i, (44)
which inverts the first i components of the vector b, brings a
balanced vector. For example,
I(0000) = {2},
I(0101) = {0, 2, 4},
I(0100) = {1, 3}.
(45)
The transformation (44) is illustrated in Table 2.
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Table 2: The structure of the vector c = b ⊕1i0n−i, where i ∈ I(b).
wt(b1, . . . , bi) = j wt(bi+1, . . . , bn) = w − j
c1 = b1 ⊕ 1, . . . , ci = bi ⊕ 1 ci+1 = bi+1, . . . , cn = bn
wt(c1, . . . , ci) = i− j wt(ci+1, . . . , cn) = w − j
(i− j) + (w − j) = n/2
It is well known [14] that
1 ≤ |I(b)| ≤ n/2 + 1. (46)
Introduce the following algorithm.
Enrollment. Represent the input vector b of length Tn as
a result of concatenation of T blocks of length n. For each
block bt, construct the set I(b) and choose an integer i(bt) ∈
{0, . . . ,n} according to a uniform probability distribution
over the set I(bt). Set
pw(b) = (i(b1), . . . , i(bn)) (47)
and store the vector pw(b) in the database.
Verification. Represent the input vector b′ of length Tn
as a result of concatenation of T blocks of length n. For each






Make the acceptance decision if and only if w′ ∈ D (T)Λ (w∗),
where w∗ is the vector whose components are equal to n/2
and the acceptance set D (T)Λ (w
∗) is defined in (32).
For example, if n = 4, then the vector 0000 is mapped to
the password “2”, the vector 0101 is mapped to the passwords
“0”, “2”, “4” with the probabilities 1/3, and the vector 0100 is
mapped to the passwords “1”, “3” with probability 1/2.
Proposition 2. Let a given vector b be transmitted over a
binary symmetric channel having the crossover probability p,
that is, the conditional probability of receiving the vector b′ at
the output of the channel is expressed as
V(b′ | b) = (1− p)n−wt(b⊕b′)pwt(b⊕b′). (49)
If i ∈ {0, . . . ,n} is assigned in such a way that b⊕ 1i0n−i is the
balanced vector and

























The proof is given in the Appendix.
An idea of the introduction of the balanced scheme is
to reduce the performance of the verifier to the worst case
performance for the basic scheme when all components of
the vector w are equal to n/2. Another disadvantage of the
scheme is the point that an attacker passes through the
verification stage with the acceptance decision by presenting
an alternating vector 0101 . . . 01. On the other hand, the
balancing scheme allows us to hide any biometric vector of
the user in his password, contrary to the basic scheme where
the password consisting of all zeroes discovers the original
vector. Furthermore, in most of the cases the same biometric
vector can be mapped to many diﬀerent passwords, since the
mapping is stochastic when the cardinality of at least one of
the sets I(b1), . . . , I(bT) is greater than 1.
The conclusion about the secrecy of the balanced scheme,
meaning the possibility of the discovery of the block given
its password, is based on the considerations below. Given an
i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, let
Mi = |{b : i ∈ I(b)}. (53)



























































































where the first inequality follows from the observation that
w = n/2 specifies one of terms of the sum for any i. Hence,
the total number of biometric vectors that are mapped to the






and the exponent asymptotically coincides with Tn.
7. Example of Using the Verification Scheme for
the DNA Data
There are data received on the basis of the DNA measure-
ments [15]. We previously used them to illustrate coding
schemes in [16, 17].
The example, described in this section, is mainly intro-
duced for the illustration, since the performance of the
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verifier probably does not allow one to recommend it for
practical use. Nevertheless, transformations of the outcomes
of the measurements seem to be typical. Notice also that
the DNA data are universal in a sense that there are 24–
28 deciphered alleles where the corresponding probability
distributions of the outcomes of the measurements are rec-
ognized as stable distributions, while processing fingerprints,
iris, and so forth requires the description of a number of
technical details.
7.1. Structure of the DNA Data and the Mathematical Model.
The most common DNA variations are Short Tandem
Repeats (STR), arrays of 5 to 50 copies (repeats) of the
same pattern (the motif) of 2 to 6 pairs. As the number
of repeats of the motif highly varies among individuals, it
can be eﬀectively used for identification of individuals. The
human genome contains several 100,000 STR loci, that is,
physical positions in the DNA sequence where an STR is
present. An individual variant of an STR is called allele.
Alleles are denoted by the number of repeats of the motif.
The genotype of a locus comprises both the maternal and
the paternal allele. However, without additional information,
one cannot determine which allele resides on the paternal
or the maternal chromosome. If the measured numbers are
equal to each other, then the genotype is called homozygous.
Otherwise, it is called heterozygous. The STR measurement
errors are usually classified into three groups: (1) allelic drop-
in, when in a homozygous genotype, an additional allele
is erroneously included, for example, genotype (10,10) is
measured as (10,12); (2) allelic drop–out, when an allele of
a heterozygous genotype is missing, for example, genotype
(7,9) is measured as (7,7); (3) allelic shift, when an allele
is measured with a wrong repeat number, for example,
genotype (10,12) is measured as (10,13).
The points above can be formalized as follows [16].
Suppose that there are N∗ sources. Let the tth source
















where at,1, at,2 ∈ {ct, . . . , ct + kt − 1} and ct, kt are given
positive integers. Thus, we assume that At,1 and At,2 are inde-
pendent random variables that contain information about the
number of repeats of the tth motif in the maternal and the
paternal allele. We also assume that (At,1,At,2),t = 1, . . . ,N∗,
are mutually independent pairs of random variables, that is,
Pr
DNA












where A	 = (A1,	 , . . . ,An,	) and a	 = (a1,	 , . . . , an,	),	 = 1, 2.
Let us fix a t ∈ {1, . . . ,N∗} and denote
Pt 
{
s = (i, j) : i, j ∈ {ct , . . . , ct + kt − 1}, j ≥ i
}
. (58)


























where γt(i, j)  π2t (i), if j = i, and γt(i, j)  2πt(i)πt( j),
if j /= i. Thus, the total number of outcomes having positive
probability is equal to
Kt = kt(kt + 1)2 . (61)
7.2. Mapping of the DNA Data to Binary Vectors and Introduc-
ing the Passwords. The outcomes of the DNA measurements
bring the following results [16]: the total number of alleles
is 28, one can extract 128 bits from the measurements of a
person, the entropy of the probability distribution over the
outcomes is equal to 109, and the maximum probability of
a vector consisting of 28 outcomes is equal to 2−76. In the
following discussion, we will assume that N∗ = 27 (the
DYS391 allele is excluded).
Let us fix t ∈ {1, . . . , 27} and let St denote the set of
cardinality |St| = Kt consisting of the outcomes that can
be received from the t-th allele with positive probability.
Associate the outcomes with the integers 1, . . . ,Kt and let
γ(i)t denote the probability of the outcome, which is mapped
to the integer i. Let us run the procedure that maps i ∈
{1, . . . ,Kt} to the integer u ∈ {0, . . . , 7} : partition the set
St in 8 subsets St0, . . . , St7 in such a way that
∑
i∈Stu
γ(i)t ≈ 2−3 (62)
and set
i −→ u⇐⇒ i ∈ Stu. (63)
The use of this procedure for t = 1, . . . ,N∗ maps 27
outcomes to a vector (u1, . . . ,u27) ∈ {0, . . . , 7}27, which can
be expressed by a binary vector b = (b1, . . . , b81).
Let us apply the verification scheme described in
Section 3 for T = 3 and n = 27. Thus, the vector b is
mapped to the password (w1,w2,w3), where w1,w2,w3 ∈
{0, . . . , 27}, and we need 15 bits to express a password in
binary format. Furthermore, let us postulate the following
model for the noise when the DNA data of the same user are
measured for the second time: with probability 1 − ε′, the
outcome of the measurement at the tth allele is the same as
before; with probability ε′, it is equal to the integer i chosen
from the set {1, . . . ,Kt} according to a uniform probability
distribution. In the following formal considerations, we
assume a simplified model where the approximate equality
(62) is replaced with the equality for all u ∈ {0, . . . , 7} and
t ∈ {1, . . . , 27}. One also assumes that the outcome of the
measurement of the same user copies the previous value of u
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with probability 1 − ε and that it takes an arbitrary value
belonging to the set {0, . . . , 7} with probability ε, where ε is less
than ε′. In a practical system, ε′ = 0.05 [15], we set ε = 0.02.
Notice that our assumptions do not seem to be critical: after
these assumptions are relaxed, the formal analysis below has
to be updated with the correction factors without essential
change of the conclusions.
































Then, qv,v′ is equal to the probability of the event that “the
weights of the tth DNA measurements” of a randomly chosen
person are equal to v and v′ at the enrollment and the
verification stages, respectively, v, v′ = 0, . . . , 3.
To express the conditional probabilities Ω(w′ | w), w,
w′ = 0, . . ., 27, run the following procedure.
(1) For v, v′ = 0, . . . , 3, set
Q(1)v,v′ = qv,v′ . (66)
(2) For k = 2, . . . , 9,
(a) for w,w′ = 0, . . . , 3k, set
Q(k)w,w′ = 0; (67)
(b) for w,w′ = 0, . . . , 3(k − 1) and v, v′ = 0, . . . , 3,




Q(k)w+v,w′+v′ := Q(k)w+v,w′+v′ + Q(k−1)w,w′ qv,v′ . (68)
(3) For w,w′ = 0, . . . , 27, set










One can see that the same procedure, being used with
ε = 1, gives the entries of the probabilities B(w′), w′ =
0, . . . , 27, that describe the output probability distribution
for the attacker (the value of parameter w ∈ {0, . . . , 27} is
arbitrary in this case). The obtained probability distributions
bring all necessary data for the verification algorithm of the
previous section when T = 3 and

















Some data are presented in Table 3 where we show only the
entries of the probability distributions that are greater than
0.01.
The data processing above illustrates several points that
can be important for the practical implementation of the ver-
ification algorithm. In particular, notice that the conditional
probability distributions Ω(w′ | w),w′ = 0, . . . , 27, were
introduced using the input probability distributions, but
they are almost independent on w and their approximation,
Ω̂(w′ | w),w′ = 0, . . . , 27, can be assigned only as the
function of ε,
(
Ω̂(w − 2 | w), Ω̂(w − 1 | w), Ω̂(w | w),
Ω̂(w + 1 | w), Ω̂(w + 2 | w)
)
= (0.02, 0.04, 0.89, 0.04, 0.01),
Ω̂(w′ | w) = 0
(72)
for w′ /∈{w−2, . . . ,w+ 2}. The verification algorithm can be
simplified in such a way that the acceptance decision is made
if and only if w′t ∈ {wt − 1,wt,wt + 1} for t = 1, 2, 3. Then,
the false rejection rate is approximated as
1− (0.04 + 0.89 + 0.04)3 = 0.11 (73)
and the false acceptance rate is approximated as
(0.15 + 0.15 + 0.13)3 = 0.08. (74)
This value has to be multiplied by a factor having the order
of magnitude of (0.15)3 = 0.003 if one is interested in the
average false acceptance rate. Notice also that the mapping
(63) gives an additional resource that decreases the false
acceptance rate: if we randomize over the mapping for t =
1, 2, 3, then the same factor of the false acceptance rate
is obtained for a fixed input vector consisting of pairs of
outcomes of the DNA measurements.
Our example also indicates the point that the mapping
of the available data to a binary string with the further
computation of the weight of the vector looks as an artificial
transformation, and “a more natural password” would be
specified as the arithmetic average of 9 integers that form the
block. However, the arithmetic average is a float, and we also
meet a problem of the specification of the length of a binary
string needed for its representation (it also determines the
length of the password in bits). We plan to discuss this point
in a future correspondence.
8. Conclusion
We presented some variants of the verification schemes
oriented to practical applications where the original bio-
metric vectors are split into blocks and converted to short
strings using block-by-block transformations. The key idea
is the translation of the statistical dependence between the
vectors of the same user into the statistical dependence
between passwords assigned to the corresponding blocks.
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Table 3: Some values of the marginal and the conditional probablity distributions over the weights for the legitimate user when ε = 0.02
and for the attacker (ε = 1).
w Pw Ω(w′ | w), w′ = 8, . . . , 19
ε = 0.02 8 0.02 0.73 0.11 0.07 0.02
9 0.03 0.02 0.88 0.05 0.03
10 0.06 0.03 0.88 0.05 0.02
11 0.10 0.03 0.88 0.05 0.02
12 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.89 0.04 0.02
13 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.89 0.04 0.02
14 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.89 0.04 0.01
15 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.89 0.03 0.01
16 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.88 0.03
17 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.88 0.03
18 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.88 0.02
19 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.88
ε = 1 any 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.02
The scheme can be introduced without assumptions about
a coordinate—wise dependence between the biometric vec-
tors, which is important for many practical applications,
like processing of the iris or fingerprints. In general case,
“the weight of the block” is the function of the total
amount of information extracted from a fixed number of
outcomes of the measurements. In particular, it can be
understood as the number of minutiae points belonging
to a certain area while measuring the fingerprint. Diﬀerent
types of the observation errors, and like missing of some
data, registration errors, synchronization errors, are also
accumulated. To implement the verification algorithm, one
is supposed to find a proper description of the conditional
probability distribution Ω without specification of the errors
that cause the corresponding transitions. This problem is
oriented to a particular application, since we do not think
that there exists a universal procedure for any biometric
observations. The analysis presented in our correspondence
can serve as a basis for the analysis of the verification
performance depending on this probability distribution.
Notice that the verification scheme can be also eﬀectively
used when the name of a person, which is used as a pointer
to a particular password stored in the database, is not
given. In this case, our approach serves as a filter to make
a preselection of passwords of the users whose biometric
vectors can be close to the presented biometric vector. As
a result, we get a typical application of hashing when the
rejection decision are made with the data that are stored in
a random access memory.
Notice also that there are diﬀerent variants of the basic
procedure. One of them, called the balancing verification
scheme, was described. Another variant appears with non-
uniform partitioning of the biometric vectors in blocks. In
this case, the blocks of lengths n1, . . . ,nT are created in such
a way that their weights are shifted from n1/2, . . . ,nT/2 “as
much as possible” to improve the performance. However,
the positions of the boundaries of the blocks have to be
stored, and one has to investigate the tradeoﬀ between the
performance and the required size of the memory. We did
not consider this problem in the present correspondence
assuming that the length of the original biometric vector and
the length of the password are fixed. In this case, for the basic
scheme, the values of Tn and T log(n + 1) are fixed, and the
values of the parameters T and n are determined.
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B. Proof of Proposition 2
We write
















































where b′′ = b′ ⊕ 1i0n−i,b̂ = b⊕ 1i0n−i, and (52) follows.
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